We present the first security analysis of conference key agreement (CKA) in the most adversarial model of device independence (DI). Our protocol can be implemented by any experimental setup that is capable of performing Bell tests (specifically, the Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko (MABK) inequality), and security can in principle be obtained for any violation of the MABK inequality that detects genuine multipartite entanglement among the N parties involved in the protocol. As our main tool, we derive a direct physical connection between the N -partite MABK inequality and the CHSH inequality, showing that certain violations of the MABK inequality correspond to a violation of the CHSH inequality between one of the parties and the other N − 1. We compare the asymptotic key rate for DICKA to the case where the parties use N − 1 DIQKD protocols in order to generate a common key. We show that for some regime of noise the DICKA protocol leads to better rates.
Quantum communication allows cryptographic security that is provably impossible to obtain using any classical means. Probably the most famous example of a quantum advantage is quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] , which allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange an encryption key whose security is guaranteed even if the adversary has an arbitrarily powerful quantum computer. What's more, properties of entanglement lead to the remarkable feature that security is sometimes possible even if the quantum devices used to execute the protocol are largely untrusted. Specifically, the notion of device independent (DI) security [3] [4] [5] models quantum devices as black boxes in which we may only choose measurement settings and observe measurement outcomes. Yet, the quantum state and measurements employed by such boxes are unknown, and may even be prepared arbitrarily by the adversary.
Significant efforts have been undertaken to establish the security of device independent QKD [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , leading to ever more sophisticated security proofs. Initial proofs assumed a simple model in which the devices act independently and identically (i.i.d.) in each round of the protocol. This significantly simplifies the security analysis since the underlying properties of the devices may first be estimated by gaining statistical confidence from the observation of the measurement outcomes in the tested rounds. The main challenge overcome by the more recent security proofs [8] [9] [10] [11] was to establish security even if the devices behave arbitrarily from one round to the next, including having an arbitrary memory of the past that they might use to thwart the efforts of Alice and Bob. Assuming that the devices carry at least some memory of past interactions is an extremely realistic assumption due to technical limitations, even if Alice and Bob prepare their own trusted, but imperfect, devices, highlighting the extreme importance of such analyses for the implementation of device independent QKD. In contrast, relatively little is known about device independence outside the realm of QKD [12] [13] [14] [15] .
Conference key agreement [16, 17] (CKA or N-CKA) is the task of distributing a secret key among N parties. In order to achieve this goal, one could make use of N −1 individual QKD protocols to distribute N − 1 different keys between one of the parties (Alice) and the others (Bob 1 , . . . , Bob N −1 ), followed by Alice using these keys to encrypt a common key to all the participants. However the existence of genuine multipartite quantum correlations can bring some advantage to multipartite tasks, and, as shown in Ref. [17] , exploring properties of genuine multipartite entanglement can lead to protocols with better performance for conference key agreement.
Here we present the first security analysis of conference key agreement in the most adversarial model of device independence. Our protocol can be implemented using any experimental setup that is capable of testing the Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko (MABK) [18] [19] [20] inequality. Our proof is based on a physical insight linking the N -partite MABK inequality and the CHSH inequality [21] . Specifically, we show that a violation of the MABK inequality detecting genuine multipartite entanglement, among the N parties involved in the protocol, corresponds to a violation of the CHSH inequality defined between one party and the other N − 1. We also compare the asymptotic rates obtained for DICKA with the implementation of N − 1 independent DIQKD, and show that for some regime of noise it is advantageous to perform DICKA. The manuscript is organised as follows: In the next Section we present the protocol and state the security definitions for conference key agreement. Then we sketch the security proof of our DICKA protocol and present the MABK-CHSH correspondence. We finish with a comparison of the asymptotic key rates. An expanded and detailed derivation of the security proof and the noise model for the asymptotic key rates are presented in the Supplementary Material.
THE PROTOCOL
For a device independent implementation of CKA, we consider a protocol with N parties: Alice who possesses one device with two inputs {0, 1}, and Bob 1 ,. . .,Bob N −1 who possess each a device with three inputs {0, 1, 2}, every input with two outputs. During the protocol, Alice and the Bobs randomly choose some rounds to test for arXiv:1708.00798v1 [quant-ph] 2 Aug 2017 the violation of the MABK inequality. They abort the protocol if the frequency of rounds where they win the MABK game do not reach a specified threshold δ. We also consider that Alice has a source for generation of the states, which is independent of her measurement device.
Protocol 1 (DICKA). 3. Error correction: Alice and the Bobs apply an error correction protocol. We call O A the classical information that Alice sends to the Bobs. For the purpose of parameter estimation, the Bobs also send some error correction information for the bits produced during the test rounds (T i = 1), we denote O (k) the error correction information sent by Bob k . If the error correction protocol aborts for at least one Bob then they abort the protocol. If it does not abort they obtain the raw keysK A = A ,K B (1...N −1) .
Parameter estimation:
If T i = 1, Alice uses A i and her guess on B (1...N −1),i to set C i = 1 if they have won the N partite MABK game, and she sets C i = 0 if they have lost it. If T i = 0, she sets
Privacy amplification:
Alice and the Bobs apply a privacy amplification protocol to create final keys K A , K B (1...N −1) . We denote S the classical information publicly sent by Alice during this step.
Security Definitions. For completeness, before stating our main result, which establishes the secret key length of Protocol 1, we first formalise what it means for a DICKA protocol to be secure. As for QKD [22, 23] the security of conference key agreement [17] can be split into two terms: correctness and secrecy. Correctness is a statement about how sure we are that the N parties share identical keys, and secrecy is a statement about how much information the adversary can have about Alice's key. , are all identical with probability at least 1 − corr . And it is sec -secret, if Alice's key K A is sec -close to a key that Eve is ignorant about. This condition can be formalized as
where · tr denotes the trace norm, l is the key length, Ω is the event of the protocol not aborting, and pΩ is the probability forΩ.
If a protocol is corr -correct and sec -secret then it is s -correct-and-secret for any s ≥ corr + sec .
So in general when we say that a CKA (or a QKD) protocol is s secure, we mean that for any possible physical implementation of the protocol, either it aborts with probability higher than 1 − s or it is s -correct-andsecret, according to Definition 1 (see Supplementary Material Section II B).
A combination of Definition 1 and the Leftover Hashing Lemma [22] relates the length of a secret key, that can be obtained from a particular protocol, with the smooth min-entropy of Alice's raw key A conditioned on Eve's information (see [22] for a detailed derivation of this statement): An sec -secret key of size
can be obtained, for sec > 2 + P A . The conditional smooth min-entropy is defined as H min (A|E) ρ := sup σ∈B(ρ) H min (A|E) σ , with the supremum taken over all positive semi-definite operators -close to ρ in the purified distance (see [24] ). For A a classical register and σ a quantum state, H min (A|E) σ represents the maximum probability with which Eve can guess the value of A if they share the state σ. In general
where the supremum is taken over all quantum states τ E .
Definition 1 was proved to be a criteria for composable security for QKD in the device dependent scenario [23] . However it is important to note that for the DI case it is not known whether such a criteria is enough for composable security. Indeed, Ref. [25] suggests that this is not the case if the same devices are used for generation of a subsequent key, since this new key can leak information about the first key. Following Ref. [11] we chose to adopt these definitions as the security criteria for DICKA.
Our main result establishes the length of a secure key that can be obtained from Protocol 1.
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 generates an
s -correct-andsecret key, with s ≤ PA + 2(N − 1) EC + 2 + EA , of length:
where EC is an error parameter of the error correction protocol, PA is the privacy amplification error probability, EA is a chosen security parameter for the protocol, and is a smoothing parameter. δ is the specified threshold bellow which the protocol aborts. The function f ( · , δ opt ) is the tangent off (·) (see Eq. (10)) in the point δ opt , where δ opt ∈]p min , p max [ is a parameter to be optimized. v = 2 log(13) + (f (p opt )/µ + 1) 1 − 2 log( · EA ) + 2 log(7) − log( 2 EA (1 − 1 − ( /4) 2 )). And the leakages due to error correction, leak EC , can be estimated according to a particular implementation of the protocol.
The security proof of Protocol 1 consists of two main steps: We first use the recently developed Entropy Accumulation Theorem [26] to split the overall entropy of Alice's string, produced during the protocol, into a sum of the entropy produced on each round of the protocol. Then we develop a new method to bound the entropy produced in one round by a function of the violation of the N -partite MABK inequality, which generalises the bound for the bipartite case derived in [5, 6] . In the following Section we sketch the steps of the proof of Theorem 1. An expanded and detailed derivation of this result is presented in the Supplementary Material.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Step 1: Breaking the entropy round by round with the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT). To prove the security of Protocol 1 we need to lower bound the smooth min-entropy of the string produced by Alice's device conditioned on all the information Eve obtains during the protocol (evaluated on the output state of Protocol 1 given the eventΩ of not aborting.),
where E denotes Eve's quantum side information and all the other registers have been defined in Protocol 1. We can treat the error correction information
that is communicated between Alice and the Bobs as as a leakage:
This relation follows from the properties of the smooth min-entropy (see [27, Lemma 6.8] ). Now, in order to bound the term
, we use the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) [26] . The EAT has already been used to prove security of device independent QKD [11] . This theorem permits to lower bound the above entropy by a sum of Von Neumann entropies evaluated on each round i. More precisely:
where v is a prefactor independent of the number of rounds and t is a lower bound (for every round i) on the Von Neumann entropy
for all initial states σ such that after the action of the protocol in round i, described by the map M i , would achieve a Bell violation larger than the chosen threshold δ (see Supplementary Material Section I D). The EAT then reduces the security proof in the most adversarial scenario to the estimation of t.
Step 2: Bounding the entropy by a function of the Bell violation. We now proceed to lower bound t for Protocol 1, i.e. we find a lower bound on the Von Neumann entropy
as a function of the violation of the MABK inequality for N parties. The MABK inequalities [18] [19] [20] are N -partite Bell inequalities that reduce to the CHSH inequality for N = 2. In order to see that, we first define the CHSH function F CHSH that takes four operators A 0 , A 1 , B 0 , B 1 as:
Note that this is the standard Bell operator used to test the CHSH inequality. Now we can define by recursion the MABK inequalities for N parties Paul 1 , . . . ,Paul N :
. Then we define by recursion,
where M K l is the operator obtained from M K l by replacing
Where MK N is called the MABK value and m is the largest number of parties that are entangled in the Npartite state.
The MABK inequalities are witnesses of m + 1-partite entanglement. A violation the MABK inequality for m = 1 proves the existence of entanglement, the violation of the inequality for m = N − 1 proves genuine N -partite entanglement, and the case where m = N gives an upper bound (tight) on what is achievable by quantum mechanics. Note that M K 2 is the normalized CHSH operator, as it corresponds to an expression with classical value 1. Now we are ready to state the result that constitute our main tool:
Theorem 2 (MABK-CHSH Correspondence). An Npartite MABK inequality with a violation MK N > 2 (m−1)/2 , for m = N −1, can be reinterpreted as a CHSH inequality for a bipartite splitting consisting of one party on one side and the N −1 other parties on the other side, achieving a violation of
Proof. To see that we replace the operators M K N −1 and M K N −1 in Eq. (8) by their renormalized versions:
. Now, note that these renormalized operators can be seen as observables (they are hermitian and their square is smaller than 1). Therefore, the N -partite MABK inequality (9) divided by 2 (N −2)/2 corresponds to a CHSH inequality, M K 2 , between Paul N and the N − 1 other Pauls.
According to Theorem 2, if Alice and the N − 1 Bobs of Protocol 1 violate the N -partite MABK inequality for m = N − 1 (i.e. the value that certifies genuine N -partite entanglement), it is equivalent to Alice playing a CHSH game with the N − 1 Bobs and achieving a violation. Therefore we can use the main result of Ref. [5] (which is a lower bound on the entropy of Alice's bit conditioned on Eve's information, as a function of the CHSH violation) to show that the function defined aŝ
. Here h(·) is the binary entropy, µ is the testing probability defined in Protocol 1, and the MABK value relates with the probability of winning the MABK game by:
As the protocol aborts when the observed violation is smaller than MK N (δ), where δ is the threshold specified in Protocol 1, we have that
And note that, sincef is a convex function of δ, its tangent in any point is also a lower bound on H, which defines t for Protocol 1 (see Supplementary Material Section II B for a detailed derivation of of Eq. (10)).
ASYMPTOTIC KEY RATE AND COMPARISON WITH DIQKD BASED PROTOCOL
Combining Eqs. (3), (4) and (5) we get a lower bound on the length of secret key we can obtain with Protocol 1, which, when divided by the number of rounds n, gives us a lower bound on the secret key rate.
In order to calculate the secret key rate, we also need to estimate the leakages due to error correction, Eq. (4), and for that we need to specify the model for an honest implementation. Modelling the noise on the distributed state as a depolarising noise we get:
and
where Q is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) between Alice and one of the Bobs. A detailed calculation of the leakage for this particular noise model is presented in the Supplementary Material Section III. Using this estimation of the leakage in the bounds for the entropy (3), and by taking µ/n → 0 we get the asymptotic key rate for Protocol 1:
We compare the above rate with the one we would have if Alice was performing N − 1 DIQKD protocols in order to establish a common key with all the Bobs [11] :
Because when Alice runs N − 1 DIQKD protocols she needs n rounds for each of the N − 1 Bobs, the key rate r
gets a factor of 1 N −1 . Note that here we consider that the cost for locally producing an N -partite GHZ state is comparable to the cost of producing EPR pairs. An analysis taking into account these costs for particular implementations will lead to a more fair comparison.
A comparison of these key rate is given in Figure 1 , where we see that in some regime of noise, it can be advantageous to use the N -partite DICKA Protocol 1 instead of N − 1 independent DIQKD protocols. , and for the distribution of a secret key between N parties through N −1 DIQKD protocols (solid lines), when each qubit experiences independent bit errors measured at a bit error rate (QBER) Q. From top to bottom, the lines correspond to N = {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. We observe that for low noise regime it is advantageous to use DICKA instead of (N − 1)×DIQKD [11] . In general, the comparison between the two methods depends on the cost and noisiness of producing GHZ states over pairwise EPR pairs.
CONCLUSION
We presented the first security proof for a fully device independent implementation of conference key agreement. We have shown that, in principle, security can be achieved for any violation of the MABK inequality that detects genuine multipartite entanglement. It remains an open point whether the protocol can be extended in such a way that for violations of the MABK inequality that certify k-partite entanglement (k < N ) we can still guarantee security.
We have compared the asymptotic key rates achieved with the DICKA protocol versus N − 1 implementations of DIQKD, modelling the quantum channel connecting the parties as depolarising channels. For implementations where the cost of local generation of GHZ states and EPR pairs is comparable, we show that it is advantageous to use DICKA for low noise regimes. A careful analysis that takes into account the costs of generation of the states is still needed for particular implementations.
We remark that our DICKA protocol can be adapted for other multipartite Bell inequalities, however in general, finding good lower bounds on Eve's information about Alice's output as a function of the Bell violation is a difficult task. The MABK-CHSH correspondence proved in Theorem 2 represents an advance in this direction. Further exploration of this technique can lead to useful relations between other Bell inequalities.
Supplementary Material
Here we expand in detail upon the security proof of the device independent conference key agreement protocol (DICKA) presented in the main text, Protocol 1.
The Supplementary Material is organised as follows: In Section I we introduce some background. We start by introducing the notation and some definitions which are going to be used in the main proofs. Then we present the entropy accumulation theorem (EAT), which constitutes an important tool of our security proof. We finish discussing the set of hypothesis contained in the device independent (DI) model. In Section II, we state the DICKA protocol and present the detailed security proof. In Section III we present the noise model to compare the asymptotic key rate of the DICKA protocol to the case where the parties perform N − 1 independent DIQKD protocols in order to generate a common key.
I. PRELIMINARIES A. Notation
We denote H A the Hilbert space of the system A with dimension |A| and H AB := H A ⊗ H B the Hilbert space of the composite system, with ⊗ the tensor product. By L(H), S a (H), P(H) and S(H) we mean the set of linear, self-adjoint, positive semidefinite and (quantum) density operators on H, respectively. For two operators
If ρ AB ∈ S(H AB ) then we denote ρ A := tr B (ρ AB ) and ρ B := tr A (ρ AB ) to be the respective reduced states. We use [n] as a shorthand for {1, . . . , n}. If we deal with a system composed with N subsystems within a round i of a protocol we denote
is the k th subsystem of the round i. If we deal with a system composed of n subsystems across the n rounds of a protocol we denote
For classical-quantum states (or cq-states)
where {p x } is a probability distribution on the alphabet X of X. We define a cq-state ρ XA|Ω conditioned on an event Ω ⊂ X as,
We will denote by CPTP maps the linear maps that are Completely Positive and Trace Preserving. Let C be an alphabet, and C 1 , . . . , C n be n random variables on this alphabet. We call freq(C n 1 ) the vector whose components labeled by c ∈ C are the frequencies of the symbol c:
B. Entropies
Throughout this work we will make use the smooth min-(max-) entropy. To define them we first define the minand max-entropies [27] .
Definition S1. If ρ AB is a bipartite state and ∈]0, 1[, we define the min-and max-entropies as,
where the infimum and the supremum are taken over all states σ B ∈ S(B). Their smooth versions are defined as
where the supremum and infimum are over all operatorsρ AB ∈ P(H AB ) in a -ball (in the purified distance) centered in ρ AB . Moreover if A is classical, the optimization can be restricted to an -ball in S(H AB ).
C. Markov Condition
The technique we are going to use for the security analysis of our DICKA protocol strongly relies on the fact that some variables satisfy the so-called Markov Condition.
Definition S2 (Markov Condition). Let ρ ABC be a state in S(H ABC ). We say that ρ ABC satisfies the Markov condition A ↔ B ↔ C if and only if
where I(A : C|B) ρ is the mutual information between A and C conditioned on B for the state ρ ABC . 
This condition becomes trivial when

D. The Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT)
The security proof of our DICKA protocol makes use of a very powerful tool called Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT), recently introduced in [26] . The EAT relates the smooth min-(max-) entropy of N subsystems to the Von Neumann entropy of each subsystem. In this section we recall some necessary definitions from [26] and state the EAT.
The entropy accumulation theorem applies to states of the form,
for some initial state ρ R0E ∈ S(H R0E ) and, ∀i ∈ [n], M i is a EAT channel defined as follows.
1. A i , B i , C i are finite dimensional systems, C i is classical and R i is an arbitrary quantum system.
For any state σ Ri−1R
, where R is isomorphic to R i−1 , the output state σ RiAiBiCiR := (M i ⊗ 1 R )σ Ri−1R is such that the classical register C i can be measured from σ AiBi .
3. Any state defined as in (S7) satisfies the following Markov conditions,
To state EAT we also need the notion of min-and max-tradeoff functions. Let P(C) be the set of distributions on the alphabet C of C i . For any q ∈ P(C) we define the set of states
and max-tradeoff function for a map M i if
If Σ i (q) = ∅, the infimum is taken to be +∞ and the supremum −∞.
We can now state the EAT.
Theorem S1 (EAT from [26] , Theorem 4.4). Let M 1 , . . . , M n be a EAT channel and ρ C n 1 A n 1 B n 1 E be a state as defined in (S7), let h ∈ R, f be an affine min-tradeoff function for all the maps
where v = 2(log(1 + 2d A ) + ∇f ∞ ) 1 − 2 log( · p Ω ), where d A is the maximum dimension of the system A i . On the other hand we have,
where we replace f by an affine max-tradeoff functionf , such that the event Ω impliesh ≥f (freq(C n 1 )).
E. Device Independent assumptions
When dealing with cryptographic tasks it is important to be precise under which assumptions a protocol is proven secure. If an assumption is not satisfied in a particular implementation, the entire security of the protocol may be compromised. The device independent framework allows one to relax many strong assumptions about the underlying system and devices, however some assumptions (without which we can probably not achieve any security) are still present and it is important to make them explicit. In the following we state the assumptions present in our model, which constitutes the standard set of assumptions made in all device independent protocols. This minimal set of assumptions is crucial for security in the device independent framework, as a relaxation of any of them compromises the security of the protocol. Assumptions 1. Our DICKA protocol considers N parties, namely Alice, Bob 1 , . . . , Bob N −1 , and the eavesdropper, Eve. They satisfy the following assumptions:
1. Each party is in a lab which is isolated from the outside (in particular from Eve). As a consequence no nonintended information can go in or out of the labs.
Each party holds a trusted random number generator (RNG).
3. All classical communications between the parties are assumed to be authenticated, and all classical operations are assumed to be trusted. 4 . Each party has a measurement device in their lab in which they can input classical information and which outputs 0 or 1. The measurement devices are otherwise arbitrary, and therefore could be prepared by Eve.
5. Alice has a source that produces some N partite quantum state ρ AiB E . This source is also assumed to be arbitrary, and therefore we can assume that it is prepared by Eve.
6. We will assume that Alice's source and her measurement device are independent (e.g. Alice can isolate the source from the measurement device). Therefore there is no non-intended communication between the source and her measurement device.
Point 6 of Assumptions 1 is usually not explicitly stated in previous works on device independent QKD, however we remark that this assumption is also present in all previous protocols. Indeed assumption 6 is important to guarantee that no extra information about the outcomes of Alice's device is leaked to Eve (since Alice and Bob are in isolated labs), apart from what she can learn from the purifying system in her possession and the classical communication intentionally leaked during the protocol. Previous protocols usually assume that an external source is responsible for producing the states. However note that in order to distribute the states to Alice and Bob's devices one need a quantum channel connecting the external source with their labs, and similarly it is assumed that no information from the devices is leaked through this quantum channel. An alternative approach is to assume that the full state for the n rounds of the protocol is already shared between the two parties at the very beginning of the protocol (and any quantum channel connecting the source and the devices is disconnected once the protocol starts). However this is an unrealistic assumption, since an implementation of such protocol would require quantum memory to last for the entire duration of the protocol. For that reason, here we chose NOT to assume that the state is already shared among all the parties, and assumption 6 prevents the simple attack described in [28, Appendix C] , where the outcome of round i is leaked throughout the state transmitted to Bob in the next rounds.
II. FROM SELF-TESTING TO DEVICE INDEPENDENT CONFERENCE KEY AGREEMENT (DICKA)
The Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [21] has been successfully used to prove security of DIQKD [11] in the most adversarial scenario, where only a minimal set of assumptions (similar to Assumptions 1) is required. The main point of using the CHSH inequality for cryptographic protocols is due to its self-testing properties, which allows one to derive properties about the devices used during the protocol. Therefore, in order to prove the security of Device Independent Conference Key Agreement (DICKA) it is very natural to think of an N partite XOR game (or an equivalent Bell inequality) to self-test the N parties. It has recently been proven that the family of Mermin-ArdehaliBelinskii-Klyshko (MABK) inequalities can self-test devices with a rigidity statement for the maximal violation [29] of the inequalities. This family of inequalities are a simple generalization of the well known bipartite CHSH inequality to N parties. In this section we first relate the MABK inequalities to the CHSH inequality, and then we use this result to prove security of a DICKA protocol.
A. Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko inequalities vs Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt inequality Mermin-Ardehali-Belinskii-Klyshko (MABK) inequalities [18] [19] [20] are Bell inequalities for N parties (N ≥ 2) that reduces to the CHSH inequality for N = 2. In this Section we will show that for any N > 2 it is possible to reinterpret an N -partite MABK inequality as a CHSH inequality. More precisely if N parties, say Alice and N − 1 Bobs, are involved in an N -partite MABK experiment, we can reinterpret this experiment as a bipartite CHSH experiment between Alice on one side and all the Bobs together on the other side. Before we formalize this argument, we will recall the definitions of CHSH and MABK inequalities. We first define the CHSH function F CHSH that takes four operators A 0 , A 1 , B 0 , B 1 as:
This allows us to define the CHSH inequality.
Definition S5 (CHSH inequality). Let A 0 , A 1 ∈ S a (H A ) be the binary observables corresponding to the two measurements applied by Alice during the CHSH experiment, and B 0 , B 1 ∈ S a (H B ) the ones that Bob applies. Therefore we have that A The CHSH inequality can be written as,
where S 2 is called the CHSH value and ρ AB ∈ S(H AB ) is the state that Alice and Bob share.
Note that if Alice and Bob violate the CHSH inequality, meaning that S 2 > 2, then Alice and Bob use a non-classical strategy i.e. ρ AB is an entangled state, A 0 does not commute with A 1 , and similarly B 0 does not commute with B 1 .
One way to generalize the CHSH inequality to inequalities between N parties, say Paul 1 , . . . , Paul N , is the following.
Definition S6 (MABK inequality). Let P i 0 , P i 1 ∈ S a (H P i ) be the two binary observables (∀k ∈ {0, 1}, P
. Then N -partite MABK operator, M K N , is defined by recursion as follows,
The N -partite MABK inequalities are then defined as,
where MK N is call the MABK value, M K l , l ≥ 2 is the operator obtained from M K l by replacing
, ∀k ∈ {0, 1}, and m is the largest number of parties that are entangled in the N -partite state ρ P (1...N ) .
The MABK inequalities are such that a violation of the inequalities for m = 1 proves that at least two parties are entangled, the violation of the inequalities for m = N − 1 proves genuine N partite entanglement, and the case where m = N gives an upper bound (tight) on what is achievable by quantum mechanics.
In order to show the reinterpretation of a MABK experiment into a CHSH experiment, we will define a rescaled version of the operator M K N , namely R N := 2
One can show using the recursion relation (S17) that
One can also check that, ∀ l ∈ [N ], R l are Hermitian operators and R l 2 ≤ 1 P (1...l) .
Let us now consider a MABK experiment where the N parties Paul 1 , . . . , Paul N violate the MABK inequality for m = N − 1, namely they achieve MK N > 2 N −2 2 . We will show in the following lemma that this can be interpreted as a CHSH experiment between Alice and Bob, Alice being Paul 1 , . . . , Paul N −1 and Bob being Paul N , where they achieve a CHSH value of S 2 = 2 √ 2 × 2
Lemma S1. A MABK experiment between N parties achieving a MABK value MK N > 2
can be seen as a CHSH experiment between any of the N parties on one side and the N − 1 other parties on the other side achieving a CHSH value of S 2 = 2
Proof. Let us write the MABK value for the MABK experiment,
where we used in the first equality the definition of R N and for the second equality the recursion relation (S19). Let us call A 
where
is the CHSH operator between the parties {Paul 1 , . . . , Paul N −1 } together and Paul N . Note that here we have split the N parties into Paul N on one side and {Paul 1 , . . . , Paul N −1 } on the other side, but by symmetry of the MABK inequality we can exchange Paul N with any Paul i , i ∈ [N − 1], which proves the statement.
Remark 1.
Since no bipartite bound entangled state can violate the CHSH inequality [30] , Lemma S1 implies that for any finite dimensional N -partite state that permits to violate the MABK inequalities for m = N − 1 (see Def. S6), there exists at least N splits of the N parties into two groups given by the Lemma S1 such that the bipartite state between this two groups is distillable, which is a similar result as in Refs. [31, 32] .
To each of the MABK inequalities we can associate an XOR game [33] . Indeed we can write the N -MABK operator as, 
where x i ∈ {0, 1} is the i th bit of x, f : {0, 1} N → {0, 1, ⊥} is a function, and we adopt the convention that (−1) ⊥ = 0. One can note that f can take the value ⊥ only when N is odd, as a consequence of the fact that for N odd, half of the terms x ∈ {0, 1} N do not appear in the inequality. We can now define an XOR game between N parties Paul 1 , . . . ,Paul N , where we ask to all the Paul k (k ∈ [N ]) the question x (k) ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and independently of the questions x (1,...,k−1,k+1,...,N ) asked to the others. Each Paul will reply a (k) ∈ {0, 1}. They can agree on a strategy (that might be quantum) before the game but they are assumed not to communicate during the game. They win if w MABK (a (1...N ) , x (1...N ) ) = 1, where  w MABK (a (1...N ) , x (1...N ) ) is the function {0, 1} 2N → {0, 1} defined as, ..N ) . The probability p w that they win the game is,
where ± corresponds to the sign of tr ( Proof. By definition of p w we have,
Here x (1...N ) is chosen uniformly at random so P (x (1...N ) ) = 2 −N . Also we can split the above sum according to the three possible values that f can take which gives us,
We can rewrite the above conditional probabilities in terms of the average of the observable P
Plugging it into equation (S31) we get,
In the second line we have
2 N/2 because when N is odd only half of the term x ∈ {0, 1} N are present in the inequality.
B. Device Independent Conference Key Agreement (DICKA)
We now present a device independent conference key agreement (DICKA) protocol and prove its security in two steps. We first use the recently developed Entropy Accumulation Theorem [26] to split the overall entropy of Alice's string produced during the protocol, into a sum of entropy produced on each round of the protocol. Then we use the relation between the MABK inequalities and the CHSH inequality, derived in the previous section, to bound the entropy produced in one round by a function of the violation of the N -partite MABK inequeality, which generalize the bounds found for the bipartite case in [6] .
The protocol
Before we describe our DICKA protocol let us first state the security definitions for DICKA. We follow the definitions given in [11] for DIQKD and generalise it to the multipartite case.
Definition S7. (Correctness) We will call a DICKA protocol corr -correct for an implementation, if Alice's and Bobs' keys,
, are all identical with probability at least 1 − corr .
Definition S8. (Secrecy) We say that a DICKA protocol is sec -secret for an implementation, if conditioned on not aborting Alice's key K A is sec -close to a key that Eve is ignorant about. More formally for a key of length l, we want
whereΩ is the event of the protocol not aborting, and pΩ is the probability forΩ.
Note that if a protocol is corr -correct and sec -secret then it is s -correct-and-secret for s ≥ corr + sec .
Definition S9 (Security
1. (Soundness) For any implementation of the protocol, either it aborts with probability greater than 1 − s or it is s -correct-and-secret.
(Completeness)
There exists a honest implementation of the protocol such that the probability of aborting the protocol is less than c , that is 1 − pΩ ≤ c .
We remark again that Definition S9 was proven to be a criteria for composable security for Quantum Key Distribution in the device dependent scenario [23] . However, for the device independent case it is not known whether such a criteria is enough for composable security. Indeed, Ref. [25] suggests that this is not the case if the same devices are used for generation of a subsequent key since this new key can leak information about the first key. Following Ref. [11] we chose to adopt Definition S9 as the security criteria for DICKA.
We now prove that the DICKA protocol presented in the main text, under the Assumptions 1, satisfies the above definitions of security. For completeness we re-state the protocol here. 3. Error correction: Alice and the Bobs apply an error correction protocol. Here we chose a protocol based on universal hashing [34, 35] . If the error correction protocol aborts for at least one Bob then they abort the protocol. If it does not abort they obtain the raw keysK A ,K B (1...N −1) . We call O A the classical information that Alice has sent to the Bobs during the error correction protocol. Also the Bobs will send some error correction information but only for the bits produced during the testing rounds (T i = 1), for the purpose of parameter estimation. We call Alice's guess on Bobs' strings G (1...N −1) , and we denote O (k) the error correction information sent by Bob k .
Protocol 1 (DICKA)
. The protocol runs as follows for N parties:
4.
Parameter estimation: For all the rounds i such that T i = 1, Alice uses A i and her guess on B (1...N −1),i to set C i = 1 if they have won the N partite MABK game in the round i, she sets C i = 0 if they have lost it, and finally she sets C i = ⊥ for the rounds i where
Privacy amplification:
Alice and the Bobs apply a privacy amplification protocol (namely the universal hashing described in [36] ) to create final keys K A , K B (1...N −1) . We call S the classical information that Alice sent to the Bobs during the privacy amplification protocol.
Note that the above Protocol 1 is very similar to the DIQKD protocol given in [11] , the difference being that since N parties are present here we use a shared N -partite GHZ state, instead of EPR pairs, and we have to add error corrections. Indeed we have an error correction protocol that permits all the parties to get the same raw key. But since we have N parties involved in the protocol, at least one of the parties needs to know all the other parties' outputs for the testing rounds (when T i = 1) in order to estimate, in the parameter estimation phase, how many times do they succeed in the MABK game. For simplicity of the analisys we choose, in Protocol 1, to communicate this information through error correction protocols.
In the ideal scenario (when there is no noise and no interference of Eve) the state ρ A n 1 B (1...N −1) n 1 produced corresponds to n copies of the N -partite GHZ state, N -GHZ state, distributed across the N parties, and Alice and the Bobs measure the following observables:
1. Alice's observable for X i = 0 is σ z and for X i = 1 it is σ x .
2. For the Bobs, they have the observable σ z for Y (k),i = 2, and for Y (k),i ∈ {0, 1} they have observables that are defined by a strategy that maximally violates the N -MABK-inequality when the measurements are performed on a N -GHZ state [19] . In particular, for each party the observable for Y (k),i = 0 and the one for Y (k),i = 1 must be maximally incompatible [29] .
In the next sections we are going to present the detailed proof of the following main result:
Theorem S2. Let EC , EC ∈]0, 1[ be the two error parameters of the error correction protocol as described in the Section II B 2, PA ∈]0, 1[ be the privacy amplification error probability, EA ∈]0, 1[ be a chosen security parameter for Protocol 1, and ∈]0, 1[ be a smoothing parameter. Protocol 1 is ( s , c , l)-secure according to Definition S9, with
, and Lemma S2) is a parameter to be optimized: more precisely p opt is the unique point were the tangent function f ( · , p opt ) to the functionf (·) (see Lemma S5) is such that f (p opt , p opt ) =f (p opt ) (by convexity of f we have ∀x ∈ [0, 1] f (x, p opt ) ≤f (x)). Finally p exp is the expected winning probability to win a single round of the MABK game for a honest implementation, δ ∈]p min , p max [ is the threshold defined in Protocol 1, andq is the vector (µδ, µ − µδ, 1 − µ) t .
Correctness
The correctness of Protocol 1 comes from the first part of the error correction protocol used by the parties, where Alice sends information to the Bobs so that they generate the raw keysK A ,K B (1...N −1) . We want here an error correction protocol that uses only communication from Alice to the Bobs and that minimizes the amount of communication needed. Therefore we are going to use an error correction protocol as the one described in [34, 35] . The idea of this error correction code is that Alice chooses a hash function and sends to the Bobs the chosen function and the hashed value of her bits. We denote this communication O A . Then each Bob k will individually use O A and his own prior knowledge B (k)
T n 1 to guess Alice's string. Each of the Bobs can fail to produce a guess, so if one of them fails the protocol aborts. In an honest implementation of the protocol, the probability that one particular Bob, say Bob k (k ∈ [N − 1]), aborts is upper bounded by EC . Therefore the probability that at least one of them aborts in an honest implementation is at most (N − 1) EC . If for k ∈ [N − 1] Bob k does not abort we then have that P (K A =K B (k) ) ≤ EC . Therefore if none of the Bobs aborts we have that,
where we take corr ≥ (N − 1) EC , which proves the following lemma:
Lemma S3. The Protocol 1 is corr -correct, for any corr ≥ (N − 1) EC , where EC is such that if ∀k ∈ [N − 1] Bob k does not abort the error correction protocol then P (K A =K B (k) ) ≤ EC .
Completeness
We call an honest implementation of the protocol, an implementation where the measurement devices used act in the same way in all the rounds of the protocol, the state used for the n rounds is of the form ρ
(the measurements and the state are then said to be identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.)), and such that for one single round, the probability of winning the N partite MABK game is p exp ∈ ]p min , p max ].
Lemma S4. For any parameter δ ∈ ]p min , p max [, Protocol 1 is c -complete, for
where p exp > δ, δ is a threshold and p min , p max are defined in Lemma S2.
Proof. Protocol 1 can abort at two moments: it can abort during the error correction or during the parameter estimation. For the error correction step, the protocol aborts if one of the Bobs aborts while trying to guess Alice's string, or if Alice aborts while guessing Bobs' testing bits. We are assuming that the Bobs use the same error correction protocol in order to send information about their outputs in the test rounds so that Alice can make her guess. Therefore the overall probability of aborting during the error correction protocol is then bounded by 2(N − 1) EC for an honest implementation. The probability of aborting during the parameter estimation part (conditioned on not aborting the error correction step) is given by:
where G (k) is Alice's guess for Bob k 's testing rounds bits. It is said to be correct when the string G (k) = B (k),I for I := {i ∈ [n] : T i = 1}. By bounding P (G (1...N −1) is correct) by 1, P (∃k : G (k) is wrong) by (N − 1) EC , and
is wrong by 1, we get
Let us consider an honest implementation such that p exp > δ, we can then rewrite (S39) as,
Note that the expectation value E(C i ) = p exp and because an honest implementation is i.i.d. we can use Hoeffding inequalities to bound
Moreover the the i.i.d. random variables T i follow a Bernoulli distribution with P (T i = 1) = µ. Pluging all of this into eq. (S41) gives us,
where the last equality comes from the binomial theorem.
Soundness
In order to complete the security proof of Protocol 1, it remains to prove secrecy. LetΩ be the event that Protocol 1 does not abort and that the error correction step is successful. The Leftover Hashing Lemma [22, Corollary 5.6.1] states that the secrecy of the final key, after a privacy amplification protocol using a family of two-universal hashing functions, depends on the amount of smooth min-entropy of the state before privacy amplification conditioned on the eventΩ .
Theorem S3 (Leftover Hashing Lemma [22] ). Let F be a family of two-universal hashing functions from {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l , such that F (A n 1 ) = K A for F ∈ F, then it holds that
According to Theorem S3, in order to prove the secrecy of Protocol 1 we need to lower bound the smooth minentropy H min (A T n 1 E) for the state after the action of the error correction map, conditioned on the event that a particular violation is observed and the error correction protocol is successful. In Lemma S7, we relate the state generated by Protocol 1 conditioned on the event that the error correction protocols were successful to the state artificially introduced in Lemma S6, and we estimate
, taking into account the information leaked during the error correction protocol. Finally, in Lemma S8, we combine the previous results proving the soundness of Protocol 1.
To bound the smooth min-entropy we will use the EAT. Indeed, before the error correction part, Protocol 1 can be described by a composition of EAT channels that we will call M 1 , . . . , M n (see Fig. S1 ).
In order to apply EAT we need to find a min-tradeoff function for the maps M i defined by the Figure S1 . I.e., we need to find a function f such that
for
where Σ i (q) is the set of states that can be generated by the action of the channel M i ⊗ 1 R on an arbitrary state and such that the classical registerC i has distribution q.
Lemma S5. The real function defined as,
is a min-tradeoff function for the EAT channels M i defined by the Figure S1 . Here µ is the testing probability of the Protocol 1, N is the number of parties in the Protocol 1, and h(x) is the binary entropy:
We define the affine function f ( · , p opt ) over the probability distribution P({1, 0, ⊥}) as,
where p opt ∈]µp min , µp max [.
Note that, for simplicity, in the main text we have definedf and f as functions of the observed winning probability. In order to make the argument more rigorous and general, here f (·, p opt ) is a function that takes as input the vector of frequencies q = q(1), q(0), q(⊥) t .
Proof. Let us take a state σC iA i B (1...N −1),i XiY (1...N −1),i TiRiR ∈ Σ i (q). Then we define the state
to be the state we obtain from σC iA i B (1...N −1),i XiY (1...N −1),i TiRiR by replacing A i by A i := A i ⊕ F i and B (1),i by B (1),i := B (1),i ⊕ F i where F i is a bit that is chosen uniformly at random. None of the other registers are changed, in particular, note that we still have that σ C i = q, where the value ofC i can be determined by the registers A i , B (1),i , and B (2...N −1),i . Moreover, since F i is completely independent of the other variables and given the definition of A i , it is easy to check that,
Using the chain rule,
and since P (
Xi, Ti Figure S1 . Description of the map Mi. This map describes the round i of the first step of the Protocol 1. Ti is chosen at random such that P (Ti = 1) = µ. Xi ∈ {0, 1} represents the "basis" in which Alice's device, represented by the CPTP map Ai, measures its input to get the output A i ∈ {0, 1}. Xi = 0 when Ti = 0 and Xi ∈R {0, 1} otherwise. Y (k),i ∈ {0, 1, 2} represents the "basis" in which Bob k 's device, represented by the CPTP map B (k),i , measures its input to get the output
Given that for X i = 0 Alice's measurement is independent of Y (1...N −1),i and T i we have
Using the definition of the conditional Von Neumann entropy we can write:
where χ(A i : F i R|X i = 0) is the Holevo quantity, and the last equality comes from the definition of A i being a uniform variable (for any value of X i ). Since A i and F i are independent (even conditioned on X i ), we get
For any state leading to a CHSH violation of
where h(x) = −x log(x) − (1 − x) log(1 − x). However, in our DICKA protocol the parties are using a MABK game to test their devices. But as we have seen, according to Lemma S1, any state leading to a MABK value MK N > 2 N −2 2 , can be reinterpreted as a bipartite state leading to a CHSH value of S 2 = 2
(S60) as the probability of winning the MABK game: 
Combining all together we have that,
Note that p w can be expressed in terms of the probability distribution q = (q(1), q(0), q(⊥)) t (where t is the transpose)
as p w = q(1)
1−q(⊥) . And because in our case the definition of the maps M i implies 1 − q(1) = µ we have p w = q (1) µ . Therefore the function
is a min-tradeoff function, andf is a differentiable convex increasing function of one variable. To find an affine min-tradeoff function f we take a tangent tof for some value p opt (n, δ) ∈ ]µ · p min , µ · p max [ to be chosen, where µ and δ are defined in the Protocol 1, which gives us, f (q, p opt ) :=f (p opt )q(1) +f (p opt ) −f (p opt )p opt .
In the following Lemma we show that the stateρ created by applying a sequence of n CPTP maps of the form described by Fig. S1 on some initial state, (when conditioned on the event of having (statistically) high enough Bell violation), possesses a linear amount of entropy. , and ρ R0E is the state shared between Alice, the Bobs, and Eve (produced by Alice's source) across the n rounds of the Protocol 1 before they apply any measurement. Then we have for any ∈]0, 1[,
whereṽ = 2 log(13) + (f (p opt ) + 1) 1 − 2 log( · p Ω ) + 2 log(7) − log(p 2 Ω (1 − 1 − ( /4) 2 )), andq = δµ, µ − δµ, 1 − µ t ∈ P({1, 0, ⊥}). 
whereq = (µδ, µ−µδ, 1−µ), c = 2 log(13)+ f (p opt ) 1 − 2 log( · p Ω ), and p Ω is the probability of the event Ω. This is true because f (q, , p opt ) is an increasing function of q(1), so for any event that implies jC j ≥ δ· j T j we have that f (freq(C n 1 ), p opt ) ≥ f (q, p opt ), in particular Ω ⇒ f (freq(C n 1 ), p opt ) ≥ f (q, p opt ). Note that because ∀x ∈ R, x ≤ x+1 we can upper bound f (p opt ) byf (p opt ) + 1 and then take c = 2 log(13) + (f (p opt ) + 1) 1 − 2 log( · p Ω ).
Using 
Using the same reasoning, we get:
leak(O (k) ) ≤ n · µ + √ n · 4 log 2 √ 2 + 1 · 2 log(8/˜ 2 EC ) + log(8/˜
